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Abstract
Car  use  is  an  increasingly  serious  problem in  many  modern  cities  because  of  polluting 
emissions,  noise, accidents and congestion. To examine this issue, this paper analyzes  the 
individual choice between taking the car and using alternative transport modes (e.g. walking, 
cycling, taking the bus etc...) in the presence of cars' negative impacts on alternative transport 
modes.  Using  a  simple  evolutionary  model,  we  show  the  existence  of  suboptimal  Nash 
equilibria  characterized  by  the  widespread  use  of  cars  and  discuss  the  effects  of  simple 
transport policies that reduce cars' negative impacts on alternative transport modes.
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1. Introduction
The current unsustainability of urban activities largely depends on the use of the car as the 
prevailing transport mode. As is well known, the extensive car use that characterizes modern 
cities all over the world generates several negative effects on the welfare of the population. In 
the first place, cars are a significant contributor to the emission of some health-damaging air 
pollutants in cities, such as: fine and coarse particulates (PMx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone 
(O3) and benzene. Ambient air pollution has been associated with increases in mortality and 
morbility in many European urban studies (EEA, 2010a). The World Health Organization 
estimates that PMx generated by urban transport accounts for 36,000-129,000 adults death a 
year in European cities; as a result, life expectancy is shortened by an average of a year (Dora 
and Phillips, 2000). In the second place, car use generates accidents: in the European Union 
more  than  40,000 people  are  killed  and more  than  150,000 are  disabled  for  life  by road 
crashes – almost half of these events take place in urban areas (WHO, 2004). Jacobs et al. 
(2000) estimated that roads crashes and injuries cost high-income countries an average 2% of 
their GNP: both direct costs (health care, rehabilitation, property damage, etc.) and indirect 
costs (lost household services and lost earnings) are considered. In the third place, car use is 
associated with noise (EEA, 2010a): transport noise disturbs and interferes with concentration 
and activities such as communication, relaxation and sleep; in addition, there are concerns 
about  direct  health  impacts  including  effects  on  the  cognitive  development  of  children, 
endocrine balance, and cardiovascular disorders. At night, almost 40 milion people (living in 
European agglomeration with more than 250,000 inhabitants) are exposed to an average road 
noise levels exceeding 50 dB, a level at which adverse health effects become measurable. All 
the above negative impacts of car use are decreasing or will decrease: between 1990 and 2007 
most air pollutants registered a significant reduction (EEA, 2010b); since the 1960s and 1970s 
both road traffic death rates and absolute values have decreased; the dramatic felling of road 
noise is one of the expected otucome of the electric car. But there is one negative impact of 
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car use which is continuosly increasing: congestion. In 2000 IWW and Infras estimated that 
additional time costs caused by road congestion amount to 1,9% of the European GDP (70-
80% of which results from urban traffic). The increasing traffic congestion deriving from car 
use is often reported by the individuals as a main cause of chronic stress and unhappiness 
(Stutzer and Frey, 2008). Several studies (e.g. Kim, 2008; Kirby and Le Sage, 2009) have 
found that in the last few years the time devoted to commuting has been constantly high or 
even further rising in most urban areas, while the average speed of cars has become very low 
in many cities. For instance, as pointed out by a recent study on Italian towns (Anci, 2009), 
the main Italian city centers show similar low average car speeds, ranging between 22 km/h in 
Milan and 26 km/h in Turin. Recent studies conducted in the UK have found that in central 
London the average car speed during rush hours fell from 12.7 miles-per-hour (mph) in 1968 
to 8.6 in 2002 (or, equivalently, from around 20 to less than 15 km/h) (Leape, 2006). Similar 
results emerge also from other studies on inner cities across Europe such as Lyon (Jensen et 
al. 2010) which reveal that urban cyclists can actually outstrip the average car speed during 
rush hours. This leads to the paradoxical result that some slow transport modes (e.g. cycling 
or walking) turn out to be faster than cars for short and medium-distance destinations, as it 
can be easily verified, for instance, by using Google maps or similar services that compare the 
time needed to go from one place to another within a town with different transport means.
The consequences of car transport and their implications for transport policy are the object of 
an  extensive  literature  and  of  a  heated  debate  among  scholars  (cf.,  among  the  others, 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Banister, 2008; Bristow et al., 2008; Moriarty and Honnery, 2008; 
Dennis and Urry, 2009; Kohler et al., 2009; Sperling and Gordon, 2009; Hull, 2011; Kemp et 
al., 2011) and institutions (e.g. DfT, 2009; EC, 2009 and 2011; EEA, 2010b; The Climate 
Group, 2011). 
The present paper intends to contribute to a deeper understanding of the forces underlying the 
current extensive car use and its welfare effects, by offering an evolutionary model that: a) 
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explains the modal split of urban mobility in terms of individual choices, and b) explicitly 
considers the negative effects of the use of the car on users of other modes. It is also assumed 
that the more the car is used, the more negative effects are generated – in terms of congestion, 
accidents, pollution and noise – both for car users and for users of alternative transport modes.
The evolutionary model proposed here contributes to the increasing strand of the literature 
that adopts an evolutionary approach to investigate environmental issues1. The evolutionary 
approach has been used to investigate several environmental issues such as: the interaction of 
cultural and biotic systems (Kallis and Norgaard,  2010), the management of ecosystems and 
common pool resources (e.g. Dietz et al., 2003; Noailly et al. 2003; Hoekstra and van den 
Bergh,  2005;  Rammel  et  al.,  2007),  the  design  of  institutions  to  foster  the  transition  to 
environmentally  sustainable  economies  (Becker  and Ostrom,  1995;  van  den  Bergh et  al., 
2007), the link between innovation strategies and environmental  regulation (e.g. Oltra and 
Saint-Jean, 2005; Sartorius, 2006; Dijk et al., 2011), individual behaviour and environmental 
policies (e.g. van den Bergh et al., 2000). Among the latter set of contributions, in particular, 
we can distinguish two research lines that are closely related to the present work. On the one 
hand, a few studies (e.g. Antoci and Bartolini, 2004; Antoci and Borghesi, 2010 and 2012) 
have  used  a  game  theoretical  evolutionary  framework  to  show  that  environmental  self-
protective  choices  can generate  suboptimal  equilibria,  leading  the economic  system along 
trajectories  in  which the economy may grow without  generating  a  corresponding welfare 
growth.2 On the other hand, some studies have recently used a similar evolutionary context to 
study the dynamics that may emerge from the implementation of a new financial mechanism 
for environmental protection originally proposed by Horesh (2002), with particular emphasis 
to its possible application and effects in the context of city-users (Antoci et al., 2012a,b). The 
1  See van den Bergh, 2007, and Faber and Frenken, 2009, for a review of the applications of evolutionary 
concepts and models to environmental economics.
2 By self-protective choices we mean any individual choice and/or expenditure performed by an agent to 
protect from environmental degradation. See the seminal paper by Leipert (1989) for a classification of the 
defensive expenditures related to such behaviour.
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present  paper  joints  and  further  enhances  these  two  research  lines  as  it  focuses  on  the 
behaviour of city users, showing the existence of possible welfare reducing paths that may 
derive from their interaction. 
The proposed model, moreover, contributes to the scarce literature that makes use of an agent-
based approach to the analysis of modal choice. As acknowledged by Hollander and Prashker 
(2006) in  a survey of transport  studies based on non-cooperative games,  only one out of 
twenty-three models deals with the issue of modal choice (Van Vugt et al., 1995); such a 
model presents a two-players game where each player chooses either car or public transport 
and a Nash equilibrium with both players using a car is generated. More recently, Sunityoso 
and Matsumoto (2009) – starting from a seminal paper on self-reinforcing motorization of 
Kitamura et al. (1999) – have proposed a model which is able to represent modal choice as the 
result  of  an imitative game involving two groups, that  is,  cooperative bus users and non-
cooperative car users; which equilibrium is generated – among the many possible – depends 
on the social interaction between the two groups of users.
Our model is at the same time simple and general, thus providing an alternative approach to 
the analysis of the problem with respect to the one prevailing so far in the existing literature. 
In particular, the model is able to represent the behavior of a whole population of city-users 
and to generate a numerous set of dynamics, without the need for heterogenous players. 
With simple but realistic assumptions the model is able to describe the dynamics that  emerge 
in  an  evolutionary  context  and  prove  the  existence  of  suboptimal  Nash  equilibria 
characterized by the widespread use of cars.  In particular,  when there can simultaneously 
exist only two pure Nash equilibria in which either everyone takes the car or none does it, 
then the former is Pareto dominated by the latter. When, on the contrary, alternative transport 
modes can coexist at the equilibrium, we show that such equilibrium is Pareto dominated by 
the state in which no city user takes the car. Moreover, the model can easily show how simple 
transport  policy  which  reduce  the  negative  effects  of  the  car  on  alternative  modes  (e.g. 
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reserved and protected lanes) may lead to equilibria featuring a higher share of buses and 
bicycles.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets forth the evolutionary model that is 
investigated  in  the paper,  Section  3 describes  the  dynamics  that  emerge  from the  model, 
distinguishing between two possible cases according to the relative impact of car use on the 
alternative  transport  modes.  Section  4  provides  a  specific  example  assuming  a  particular 
specification of the payoff funcions. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
In each instant of time t, city users have to choose whether to use a private car (choice A) or 
to use an alternative transport mode (walking, cycling, using buses or trams etc...) (choice B). 
Let us indicate by  )(tx  the share of the population of city users adopting choice A at the 
instant t; consequently )(1 tx− represents the share of those choosing B.
We  will  denote  with  )(xAΠ  and  )(xBΠ the  payoff  functions  of  strategies  A  and  B, 
respectively. The process of adopting strategies A and B is modeled by the so called replicator 
dynamics  (Weibull,  1995),  according  to  which  the  strategy  whose  expected  payoffs  are 
greater than the average payoff spread within the populations at the expense of the other. In 
our case, the replicator dynamics can be written as:
[ ])()()1( xxxxx BA Π−Π−=
• (1)
Where  •x  is  the  time derivative  of  x(t).  Notice  that  the  pure population  states  1=x  (all 
individuals  adopt  strategy  A)  and  0=x  (all  individuals  adopt  strategy  B)  are  always 
stationary states of dynamics (1) (that is 0=
•
x  if 1=x  or 0=x ). A mixed population state 
)1,0(∈x  is a stationary state of (1) if and only if )()( xx BA Π=Π , that is if the payoffs of the 
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two  available  strategies,  evaluated  at  x ,  are  equal  and  consequently  no  individual  is 
motivated to revise his strategy choice.
We make the following assumptions about the derivatives of )(xAΠ  and )(xBΠ : 0)(' <Π xA  
and  0)(' ≤Π xB ; that is, when  x increases, the payoff of A strictly decreases while that of B may 
strictly decrease or remain constant. In this context, we will distinguish between two possible 
cases depending on whether )(xAΠ  decreases less or more rapidly than )(xBΠ . The former 
is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  the  diffusion  of  the  strategy  A  (to  use  the  car)  in  the 
population of city users produces negative effects which are higher for individuals choosing 
strategy B rather than for those adopting strategy A. The opposite holds in the latter context.
3. Evolutionary dynamics
3.1.  Scenario  1:  )(')('0 xx BA Π>Π>  (an  increase  in  x negatively  affects  individuals 
choosing strategy A less than those adopting strategy B).
In this context, the payoff difference  )()( xx BA Π−Π  is a strictly increasing function of the 
share x (being 0)(')(' >Π−Π xx BA  always); that is, the relative performance of strategy A, 
with respect to strategy B, increases when x increases. We can distinguish three possible sub-
cases, according to the relative position of the curves )(xAΠ  and )(xBΠ  in the ),( Πx  plane 
(see Figures 1-3). In particular, the dynamic regimes under equation (1) can be classified as 
follows: 3
Proposition 1.  In the context  )(')('0 xx BA Π>Π> ,  the taxonomy of the dynamic regimes  
exhibited by equation (1) is:
a) If  )0()0( BA Π≥Π  (i.e.  the graph of  )(xAΠ  always lies above that of )(xBΠ ), 
then whatever is the initial distribution  )1,0()0( ∈x  of strategies, the trajectory  
3   The proofs of the following propositions are straightforward, so we shall omit them.
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starting from  )0(x  approaches the stationary state  1=x , where all individuals  
adopt strategy A (see Figure 1). 4
b) If )1()1( BA Π≤Π  (i.e. the graph of )(xAΠ  always lies below that of )(xBΠ ), then 
whatever is the initial distribution )1,0()0( ∈x  of strategies, the trajectory starting  
from  )0(x  approaches  the stationary state  0=x ,  where all  individuals  adopt  
strategy B (see Figure 2).
c) If  )0()0( BA Π<Π  and  )1()1( BA Π>Π  (i.e.  the  graphs  of  )(xAΠ  and  )(xBΠ  
cross in the  ),( Πx  plane), then there exists a mixed population stationary state
)1,0(∈= xx , which is repulsive. Whatever is the initial distribution  xx >)0(  of  
strategies, the trajectory starting from )0(x  approaches the stationary state 1=x  
while  whatever  is  the  initial  distribution  xx <)0(  of  strategies,  the  trajectory  
starting from )0(x  approaches the stationary state 0=x  (see Figure 3).
Insert Figures 1-3 about here
The above proposition shows that, in the context )(')('0 xx BA Π>Π> , the adoption process 
of choices  A and B is  self-enforcing and only pure population  attractive stationary states 
(which are, in such case, Nash equilibria) can exist where either 1=x  (all individuals choose 
A) or 0=x  (all individuals choose B). In case (c) of the proposition, the dynamics is path-
dependent in that the final outcome ( 0=x  or 1=x ) is determined by the initial distribution 
)0(x  of strategies. This means that if a sufficiently high number of agents chooses to use the 
car ( xx >)0( ), then also the others will make the same choice, so that at the end of the day 
everyone uses the car ( 1=x ). Similarly, if a sufficient number of agents decides not to use 
4 Notice that )(xAΠ  and )(xBΠ have been represented as concave functions in the figures, so that the agents’ 
payoffs diminishes at an increasing rate as  x increases.  The classification of the possible cases described 
above,  however,  depends  only  on  the  relative  positions  of  the  graphs  of  )(xAΠ  and  )(xBΠ and  is 
independent of their shape as long as the payoffs difference )()( xx BA Π−Π  is a monotonic function of x.
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the car (i.e. their share  x is initially below the threshold level  x ), this strategy will spread 
across the population so that none uses the car at  the equilibrium ( 0=x ).  The attractive 
stationary states 0=x  and 1=x  can, therefore, be interpreted as stable social conventions in 
which all agents make homogeneous choices and a unique strategy prevails in the population. 
Notice that the population average payoff is given by:
)()1()(:)( xxxxx BA Π−+Π=Π
So )1()1( AΠ=Π  and )0()0( BΠ=Π . As Figures 2 and 3 show, in the cases (ii) and (iii) of the 
Proposition 1, )1()0( AB Π>Π  always holds. In other words, the agents are always better-off 
if they all choose strategy B (i.e. they do not use the car) rather than if they all choose A. 
However, if the curves cross (Figure 3), the dynamics of the model may lead the agents to 
adopt the strategy A that will make everyone worse-off. In fact, if the initial share 0x  is above 
the threshold level x , the strategy A is individually perceived as the best strategy in response 
to  the others’  choices  (i.e.  )()( xx BA Π>Π  for  every xx >0 ).  As the  use of  cars  spreads 
among the  population,  however,  the  whole community  ends  up on a  socially  undesirable 
outcome since the agents’ welfare in 1=x  is lower than in 0=x . In this case, the choice of 
strategy A gives  origin  to  an undesirable  social  convention  that  represents  a  stable  Nash 
equilibrium of the economy.
A similar outcome may also occur when the graph of )(xAΠ  lies always above that of )(xBΠ  
so  that  everyone  wants  to  move  by  car  (case  (a)  of  Proposition  1).  As  Figure  1  shows, 
although  )()( xx BA Π>Π  for every  x, we can still have  )1()0( AB Π>Π . Even in this case, 
therefore, the strategy selection process may thus lead the agents to choose 1=x  although the 
welfare level in 1=x is lower than in 0=x . In this case, differently from the cases (b) and (c) 
of Proposition 1, the stationary state 0=x  is not attractive under evolutionary dynamics (1). 
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Finally, notice that )()()1()(:)( xxxxxx BBA Π=Π−+Π=Π  holds, being )()( xx BA Π=Π , in 
the context  (c) of Proposition 1.  Since  )()0( xBB Π>Π  (see Figure 3),  then the attractive 
stationary  state  0=x  also  Pareto-dominates  the  repulsive  stationary  state  x  where  both 
strategies coexist.
The following proposition sums up the above results on welfare.
Proposition 2. In the context )(')('0 xx BA Π>Π> , we have that:
1) the stationary state 0=x  always Pareto-dominates the stationary state 1=x , that is 
)1()0( Π>Π , in sub-cases (b) and (c) of Proposition 1. Furthermore, 0=x  may also 
dominate 1=x  in sub-case (a), that is, even if  0=x  is not attractive; in particular,  
this happens when )1()0( AB Π>Π  (as in Figure 1).
2) The stationary state 0=x  always Pareto-dominates the stationary state )1,0(∈x , that 
is )()0( xΠ>Π .
3.2.  Scenario  2:  0)(')(' ≤Π<Π xx BA  (an  increase  in  x negatively  affects  individuals 
choosing strategy A more than those adopting strategy B).
In this context, the payoff difference )()( xx BA Π−Π  is a strictly decreasing function of the 
share x; that is, the relative performance of strategy A, with respect to strategy B, decreases 
when x increases. As we shall see, this context favors the coexistence between strategies A 
and B. Like for Scenario 1, even in this case we can distinguish three possible sub-cases 
according to the relative position of the curves )(xAΠ  and )(xBΠ  in the ),( Πx  plane, as the 
following proposition shows (see Figures 4-6).
Proposition 3.  In the context  0)(')(' ≤Π<Π xx BA ,  the taxonomy of the dynamic regimes  
exhibited by equation (1) is:
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a) If )1()1( BA Π≥Π  (i.e. the graph of )(xAΠ  always lies above that of )(xBΠ ), then 
whatever is the initial distribution )1,0()0( ∈x  of strategies, the trajectory starting  
from  )0(x  approaches  the  stationary  state  1=x ,  where  all  individuals  adopt  
strategy A (see Figure 4).
b) If  )0()0( BA Π≤Π  (i.e.  the graph of  )(xAΠ  always lies below that of )(xBΠ ),  
then whatever is the initial distribution  )1,0()0( ∈x  of strategies, the trajectory  
starting from  )0(x  approaches the stationary state  0=x , where all individuals  
adopt strategy B (see Figure 5).
c) If  )0()0( BA Π>Π  and  )1()1( BA Π<Π  (i.e.  the  graphs  of  )(xAΠ  and  )(xBΠ  
cross in the  ),( Πx  plane), then there exists a mixed population stationary state
)1,0(∈= xx ,  which  is  globally  attractive.  Whatever  is  the  initial  distribution 
)1,0()0( ∈x  of  strategies,  the  trajectory  starting  from  )0(x  approaches  it  (see 
Figure 6).
Insert Figures 4-6 about here
Notice that in sub-case (c) of Proposition 3, at the stationary state )1,0(∈x  one can observe 
heterogeneous  choices  within  the  population  (some  people  choose  strategy  A and  others 
choose strategy B) and the coexistence between these strategies tends to persist over time (the 
stationary state being attractive).
Notice that, since )()()1()()( xxxxxx BBA Π=Π−+Π=Π  and )0()0( BΠ=Π , in the context 
(c) of Proposition 3 it holds )()0( xBΠ≥Π . Consequently, the repulsive stationary state 0=x  
Pareto-dominates the attractive stationary state x  if )()0( xBB Π>Π  holds (as in Figure 6). In 
such case, although everyone would be better-off choosing strategy B (i.e. at 0=x ), the dy-
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namics that emerge from the strategy adoption process leads away from 0=x  towards the at-
tractive state x , so that when xx <)0(  the community moves along a welfare-reducing path.
Notice that  )()0( xBB Π=Π  holds if  0)(' =Π xB  for every  ),0( xx ∈ , that is, if the payoff 
)(xBΠ  does not depend on the share x in the interval ),0( x .
Welfare properties of attractive stationary in sub-cases (a) and (b) of Proposition 3 can be 
analyzed following the same steps followed for sub-cases (a) and (b) of Proposition 1. The 
following proposition sums up the results on welfare in the context 0)(')(' ≤Π<Π xx BA .
Proposition 4. In the context 0)(')(' ≤Π<Π xx BA , we have that:
1) The stationary state 0=x  always Pareto-dominates the stationary state 1=x , that is 
)1()0( Π>Π , in sub-cases (b) and (c) of Proposition 3. Furthermore, 0=x  may also 
dominate 1=x  in sub-case (a), in particular, this happens when )1()0( AB Π>Π  (as in 
Figure 4).
2) The stationary  state  0=x  Pareto-dominates  the  stationary  state  )1,0(∈x ,  that  is 
)()0( xΠ>Π , if )()0( xBB Π>Π , that is, if the payoff function )(xBΠ  is not constant  
in  the  interval  ],0[ x .  A  sufficient  condition  to  have  )()0( xBB Π=Π  (no  Pareto-
dominance of 0=x  over x ) is 0)(' =Π xB  for every )1,0(∈x .
The Proposition above suggests that, if the relative performance of using the car is inversely 
related to the share of car users, then the society converges towards an equilibrium in which 
the agents are worse-off than in the case where there are no car users. However, if we could 
eliminate the negative effects that cars can have on pedestrians, cyclists and other users of 
alternative transport systems (i.e. if the strategy B is such that 0)(' =Π xB  for every )1,0(∈x
), then individuals would be equally well-off at the attractive stationary state x  as in the case 
12
with no cars around. This can be obtained, for instance, by introducing pedestrians zones or 
fast lanes specifically devoted to cyclists or buses from which cars are banned, so that the 
former are not trapped in the traffic jam.5
4. A specific example
To fix ideas, in this section we analyze dynamics (1) under a particular specification of the 
payoff functions )(xAΠ  and )(xBΠ , in particular, we pose: 
2)( bxaxA −=Π
2)( dxcxB −=Π
where a, b, c, d are parameters of the model.
In this context, the replicator equation (1) becomes:
[ ] [ ]2)()1()()()1( xdbcaxxxxxxx BA −−−−=Π−Π−=•
Furthermore, we have:
aA =Π )0( , baA −=Π )1( , cB =Π )0( , dcB −=Π )1(
The parameters a and c measure the net benefit of using the car and the alternative transport 
modes, respectively, in absence of other car users (i.e. when 0=x ). The parameters b and d 
measure  the  negative  effects  generated  by  the  diffusion  of  choice  A  in  the  city  users 
population (e.g. the effects due to traffic congestion, accidents or air pollution), which in this 
payoffs specification are assumed to increase more than proportionally with the share x.
With  this  payoffs  specification,  the  Scenario  1  (where  )(')('0 xx BA Π>Π>  holds) 
corresponds to the case 0>> bd  while the Scenario 2 (where 0)(')(' ≤Π<Π xx BA  holds) 
5 Notice, however, that fast lanes are not sufficient to avoid the exposure to air pollutants released by cars and 
the related health-damages that are inevitably suffered by pedestrians, cyclists and those waiting at the bus 
stop because of the traffic congestion that surrounds them. The absolute value of )(' xBΠ , therefore, can be 
substantially reduced by the adoption of fast lanes but is difficult to actually obtain 0)(' =Π xB  for every x.
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corresponds to the case 0≥> db . In the context 0>> bd , the repulsive interior stationary 
state  x  (see case (c) of Proposition 1) is given by  
bd
acx
−
−
= . The point  x  separates the 
basin  of  attraction  ]1 ,(x  of  the  Pareto-dominated  stationary  state  1=x  from that  of  the 
stationary state  0=x ,  ) ,0[ x (see Figure 3). The next proposition illustrates how the size of 
these basins of attraction varies according to the variations in the parameters of the model.
Proposition 5.  The size of the basin  ) ,0[ x  increases (and, consequently,  the size of  ]1 ,(x  
decreases)  if  the  values  of  the  parameters  b  and c  increase  or  if  the  values  of  a  and d  
decrease.
The proof is straightforward.
Stated differently, a decrease in the net benefit a of using the car when there are no other cars 
around and/or an increase in the negative impact b of using the car on the other car users tend 
to reduce the attraction basin of 1=x  with respect to that of 0=x . This means that a lower 
initial share of non-car users will be sufficient to induce a similar choice in the rest of the 
population. As one would reasonably expect, the same result occurs with an increase in the 
net  benefit  c of  using alternative  transport  modes  and/or  with a  decrease  in  the  negative 
impact d that cars may have on pedestrians, cyclists, bus users and all the other city users that 
do not take the car.
In the context  0≥> db , the globally attractive interior stationary state  x  (see case (c) of 
Proposition 3) is given by 
db
cax
−
−
= .
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The following proposition illustrates how the attractive interior stationary state  x  and the 
corresponding value of the average payoff )(xΠ  vary in response to variations in parameter 
values.
Proposition 6. The value of x  increases (and, consequently, the number of individuals using 
cars increases) if the values of the parameters a and d increase or if the values of b and c 
decrease. Furthermore, in the context b > d > 0, the values of  )(xΠ  and x  are inversely  
correlated.
As the Proposition states, the higher is the net benefit of using the car and/or the negative 
impact of this choice on alternative transport users, the higher is the incentive to use the car 
and the number of agents who makes this  choice at  the equilibrium, but the lower is the 
correspondent  welfare  level  that  agents  will  enjoy.  In  other  words,  if  car  users  have  an 
increasing adverse effect on city users who do not take the car (because of increasing health 
damages, accidents and difficulty to move across the city with alternative transport systems), 
then the choice of using the car will obviously spread across the population, but that turns out 
in the end to be detrimental for everyone (both car users and non-car users). This calls for 
appropriate transport policies that may “protect” non-car users from the negative impact that 
they suffer from the rest of the population and may increase, on the contrary, the net benefit 
of using alternative transport modes.
5. Conclusions
This paper deals with one of most frequently reported problems affecting the life quality and 
sustainability of modern towns, namely, the extensive and ever increasing use of private cars 
as the prevailing transport mean. This phenomenon is well-known by long in industrialized 
countries, where city centers are often congested and highly polluted due to car traffic, but is 
bound to become extremely relevant also in many developing countries in the future for the 
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large  rise  in  the  number  of  cars'  owners  that  we  may  expect  to  occur  along  with  their 
economic growth in the years to come. 
Car owners certainly enjoy higher benefits from the use of their private cars than users of any 
alternative transport system. Cars, in fact, are undoubtedly more comfortable and potentially 
faster than most alternative means; what is particularly relevant, they avoid the time spent 
waiting for public transport at the bus or metro stops and allow their owners to leave and stop 
whenever they want. On the other hand, cars imply higher costs to their owners in terms of 
purchase cost, fuel costs, insurance, repairing and maintenance costs, and time spent being 
“caught” in traffic jams and looking for a parking place. These private costs, together with the 
collective  ones  that  the  car  use  imposes  on  the  rest  of  the  society  (e.g.  in  terms  of 
environmental  and  health  problems,  or  productivity  loss  due to  the  traffic  jam)  raise  the 
question of whether and under which conditions the currently widespread choice of using the 
car can be welfare improving at the individual and collective level. 
To examine this issue, we proposed an evolutionary approach that differs from most existing 
contributions in the present literature on this issue and analyze the possible dynamics that can 
emerge  in  a  society  in  which  individuals  can  decide  whether  to  move  by  car  or  with 
alternative transport modes. As shown in the paper, if the relative performance of cars with 
respect to alternative transport modes increases with the number of car users, then a unique 
strategy will end up prevailing in the society, so that all agents will choose either to take or 
not to take the car. If, on the contrary, using the car becomes less and less advantageous as the 
number of car users increases, then there exists an additional attractive equilibrium beyond 
the two extreme ones described above, namely a fixed point with mixed strategy in which 
some agents decide to use the car, while others prefer to use the alternative transport modes6. 
In both cases we show that the no-cars equilibrium can Pareto dominate the other attractive 
6  It must be stressed that the coexistence of alternative transport modes that is observed in reality may 
also correspond to all the out-of-equilibrium cases that are associated with the transition towards the “pure” 
equilibria x=0 and x=1.
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equilibria (with all or some car users). In the latter case, moreover, eliminating the negative 
impacts that car users impose on the rest of the society by introducing, for instance, protected 
lanes for buses or bicycles, can increase the average welfare level, making all agents equally 
well-off as in the equilibrium with no cars.
Although the model proposed here is admittedly very simple, in our opinion it can provide an 
appropriate representation of the dynamics of modal choice7 and a few basic insights on its 
policy implications. The present model and its preliminary results can be extended in several 
directions in the future. In the current analysis, for instance, we considered all the alternative 
(non-car) transport modes at the aggregate level without distinguishing between them for the 
sake of simplicity. Each transport mode has instead specific features that should be examined 
in further details to investigate the possible interactions that may occur between the users of 
alternative transport modes (e.g. cyclists and bus users). Moreover, it would be interesting to 
analyze what is the optimal mix among the alternative transport systems given their initial 
distribution in the society and how policy-makers can achieve this optimal mix through an 
appropriate intervention on transport fees. We leave these important issues for future research.
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Figure  1:  πB  steeper  than  πA and  always  below  it  (everybody  uses  the  car  at  the 
equilibrium)
Figure 2: πB steeper than πA and always above it (none uses the car at the equilibrium)
Figure 3: πB intersects πA from above: if x  is initially above (below) x , then everybody 
(none) uses the car.
0
π
0 1
πB
πA
0
πA
πB
πB
πA
x
x
x
π
π
x
1
Figure  4:  πA  steeper  than  πB and  always  above  it  (everybody  uses  the  car  at  the 
equilibrium)
Figure 5: πA steeper than πB and always below it (none uses the car at the equilibrium)
Figure 6: πA intersects  πB from above:  x  tends to  x (stable equilibrium) whatever the 
initial level of x . 
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